A:
Accountable person (higher-risk building)
(UTT) Unsdirfer v Octagon [2024] UKUT 59 (LC): For the purpose of s72(1) of the BSA an “accountable person” for a higher-risk building did not include a manager appointed under section 24 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987. By virtue of s72(2) of the BSA, most RTM companies were an accountable person.
Ancillary orders
Lessees of flats at 419 High Road, Space Apartments, N22 8JS v Avon Ground Rents Ltd (FTT) (LON/00AP/ HYI/2022/0017): Ancillary orders, necessary to make a s123 Remediation Order effective and workable, could be made by the Tribunal [74].
Associated (s124/125, s121)
Triathlon Homes LLP v Stratford Village Development Partnership & Ors (FTT) (LON/00BB/HYI/2022/0018-22): An associate might exist between beneficiaries of a trust and their trustees, between current and former partners and their partnerships, between directors and their companies, and between companies with common directors or controlling interests [38].
Associated (s130(4), s131)
381 Southwark Park Road RTM Company Limited & Ors v Click St Andrew Limited (In Liquidation) & Anor (2025) 219 Con LR 29: Click Group Holdings controlled or did control Click St Andrews within the meaning of s131(4) of the BSA because Click Group Holdings held all the shares of Click Above Limited and Click St Andrews was a wholly owned subsidiary of Click Above Limited. Holdings controlled Click St Andrews indirectly in the sense that it was able, through the corporate structure, to secure that the affairs of Click St Andrews were conducted in accordance with its wishes [7]. BDW Trading Ltd v Ardmore Construction Ltd & Ors (2025) 219 ConLR 1: For the purpose of s131 BSA the precise and carefully confined definition of “associate” was relatively extensive on account of the definition of “the relevant period” [13, obiter].
B:
Building Liability Order (Quantification)
381 Southwark Park Road RTM Company Limited & Ors v Click St Andrew Limited (In Liquidation) & Anor (2025) 219 Con LR 29: the Court was not required to quantify the relevant liability at the point of making a BLO, particularly in circumstances where the Court had no figures to enable it to do so [29].
Building Safety Fund (s123)
SoS v Grey GR Limited (Chocolate Box) (FTT) (CHI/00HN/HYI/2023/0008): The obligation on a landlord to undertake BSA works did not only arise on receipt of BSF funding. There was no hint in the statutory provisions that funding played any part. A failure to make progress on BSA works due to seeking funding weighed heavily when considering whether to make a Remediation Order [259].
Building Safety Fund (s124)
Triathlon Homes LLP v Stratford Village Development Partnership & Ors (FTT) (LON/00BB/HYI/2022/0018-22): When deciding whether it was just and equitable to make an RCO, the Tribunal gave some weight to the possibility that there was uncertainty if the BSF refused further help [268]. It was difficult to see how it could ever be just and equitable for a party falling within s124(3) and able to fund remediation works to be able to claim that the works should instead be funded by the public purse. The public purse should not act as an interim funder and underwriter of the risk of failure, while claims against third parties wended their way to a conclusion. Public funding was a matter of last resort [278].
Building Safety Risk (s120(5))
Grey GR Limited Partnership v Edgewater (Stevenage) Limited & Ors (Vista Towers) (2025) 218 ConLR 66 (FTT) (CAM/26UH/HYI/2023/0003): For the purpose of s120(5) of the BSA, any risk above “low” risk might be a “building safety risk”. A low risk was the ordinary unavoidable fire risks in residential buildings and/ or, in relation to PAS 9980, was an assessment that fire spread would be within normal expectations [72].
Building Safety Risk (s130(3)(b))
381 Southwark Park Road RTM Co Ltd v Click St Andrews Ltd (2024) 218 Con LR 258: Breaches relating to fire and structure posed a building safety risk within the meaning of s130(3)(b) of the BSA [198], [219].
C:
Corporate Veil
Grey GR Limited Partnership v Edgewater (Stevenage) Limited & Ors (Vista Towers) (2025) 218 ConLR 66 (FTT) (CAM/26UH/HYI/2023/0003): The power to make RCOs against associated companies was a radical departure from normal company law, but it did not pierce the corporate veil because it did not expose the individual members to unlimited personal liability [351]; Triathlon Homes LLP v Stratford Village Development Partnership & Ors (FTT) (LON/00BB/ HYI/2022/0018-22): The power to make RCOs against associated bodies corporate and partnerships eroded and elided corporate identity and deprived it of some of its main advantages, but did so for specific purposes and within specific limits [252].
Costs
Grey GR Limited Partnership v Edgewater (Stevenage) Limited & Ors (Vista Towers) (2025) 218 ConLR 66 (FTT) (CAM/26UH/HYI/2023/0003): The tribunal was not generally a cost-shifting jurisdiction and should not be taken to be encouraging a costs application in the context of an RCO [389].
D:
Developer
Grey GR Limited Partnership v Edgewater (Stevenage) Limited & Ors (Vista Towers) (2025) 218 ConLR 66 (FTT) (CAM/26UH/HYI/2023/0003): The developer was a key target of an RCO, at the top of the hierarchy of liability [232, 350].
I:
Impecuniosity
Grey GR Limited Partnership v Edgewater (Stevenage) Limited & Ors (Vista Towers) (2025) 218 ConLR 66 (FTT) (CAM/26UH/HYI/2023/0003): Impecuniosity was not a significant reason for or against making an RCO [352].
Information Order (Respondent)
BDW Trading Ltd v Ardmore Construction Ltd & Ors (2025) 219 ConLR 1: An IO can only be made against the “original body” which had a relevant liability, and not an associated company, which was contrary to the example in the BSA Explanatory Notes [17].
Information Order (Relevant Liability)
BDW Trading Ltd v Ardmore Construction Ltd & Ors (2025) 219 ConLR 1: Information Orders under s132 BSA may only be made where “it appears to the court… that the body corporate is subject to a relevant liability”. It was not necessary to have already established liability (albeit there was no difficulty if had been by judgment, award, adjudication decision or admission) but potential liability was not sufficient. There should be no question at all of adopting anything like trial procedures to determine the question – applications should be short and uncomplicated. IOs might be made sparingly where liability was in issue [25, 27, 29].
Information Order (Scope)
BDW Trading Ltd v Ardmore Construction Ltd & Ors (2025) 219 ConLR 1: Information and documents to enable the applicant to identify associates of the respondent. In appropriate cases, also matters concerning the financial position of the associate [40, obiter].
Insurance
Tobias & Ors v Grosvenor Freeholds Limited (The Central) (FTT) (LON/00AG/BSA/2024/0008): The potential availability of Premier Guarantee insurance in respect of “relevant defects” was not given significant weight by the FTT when exercising its discretion to make a remediation order.
J:
Just and Equitable (s124)
Triathlon Homes LLP v Stratford Village Development Partnership & Ors (FTT) (LON/00BB/ HYI/2022/0018-22): The power was discretionary and should be exercised having regard to the purpose of the BSA and all relevant factors. The purpose included to ensure that where a development was carried out by a thinly capitalised or insolvent development company, a wealthy parent company or other wealthy entity which was caught by the association provisions could not evade responsibility by hiding behind the separate personality of the development company [237] [266]. Grey GR Limited Partnership v Edgewater (Stevenage) Limited & Ors (Vista Towers) (2025) 218 ConLR 66 (FTT) (CAM/26UH/HYI/2023/0003): The s124 BSA just and equitable test was deliberately wide so that money could be found. The jurisdiction may be protean. It was helpful to ask whether the relevant remedial works/ costs were within a reasonable range of responses [83, 349].
Just and Equitable (s130)
381 Southwark Park Road RTM Company Limited & Ors v Click St Andrew Limited (In Liquidation) & Anor (2025) 219 Con LR 29: FTT considerations in Triathlon Homes LLP considered [9 – 15]. The indicators were in favour of making an order in respect of the holding company, because it was the holding company and had a common directing mind [15, 25]. However, a BLO must only relate to a relevant liability within the meaning of the BSA, and was not a “gateway” to the recovery of all losses [26 - 28].
L:
Landlord’s Certificate
Will & Anor v G&O Properties (FTT) (LON/00AT/HYI/2022/0003): The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make an order determining whether a relevant landlord had failed to comply with the requirement to provide a Landlord’s Certificate confirming whether or not the landlord met the contribution condition (ie a net worth of £2,000,000) and/or whether or not they (or an associate) were responsible for a relevant defect, as required by the Building Safety (Leaseholder Protections) (England) Regulations 2022.
Limitation (s135)
BDW Trading Ltd v URS Corporation Ltd [2025] UKSC 21: The retrospective limitation period established by section 135 of the BSA was not restricted to actions brought under s1 Defective Premises Act 1972, but could equally apply to actions merely dependent on s1, such as a claim for damages in negligence or for contribution [103, 113, 114, 163, 295, 297, 304]. (Obiter) The retrospective limitation period did not apply to s2A of the Defective Premises Act 1972 because it was not a “relevant provision” already in force [269].
P:
Parties (to main claim, BLO)
Willmott Dixon Construction Ltd v Prater (2024) 214 Con LR 164: the BSA did not require a party against whom a Building Liability Order (s130) is sought to be made a party to the main claim/substantive claim, or to participate in those proceedings. However, if a BLO was contemplated it would generally be sensible and efficient for the party against whom the order was sought to be made a party and for the BLO application to be heard together with the main claim [17], [18], [21], [22], [24], [25]. In 381 Southwark Park Road RTM Co Ltd v Click St Andrews Ltd (2024) 218 Con LR 258 the Court confirmed that there was no requirement on a party to claim a BLO within existing proceedings: “the circumstances in which it might be just and equitable to make the order may not arise until after proceedings to establish a relevant liability are concluded and a BLO could be sought against a corporate body that did not even exist at the time of those proceedings” [31].
Prejudice (s123)
Lessees of flats at 419 High Road, Space Apartments, N22 8JS v Avon Ground Rents Ltd (FTT) (LON/00AP/ HYI/2022/0017): Where a respondent to a claim for a Remediation Order pursuant to s123 BSA engaged with the process and was willing to complete works the Tribunal considered the balance of prejudice which would be caused by, on the one hand, making the order and, on the other hand, not making it. The Tribunal concluded that the greater prejudice would be caused to the lessees if no order were made [59-64].
Principal Accountable Person (ss73 and 75)
Brompton Estates Nominees No.1 Limited & Anor v Wall Properties Limited (FTT) (LON/00AW/ BSG/2024/0001): There was no guidance in the BSA as to how the Tribunal was to determine which accountable person was appropriate to be the principal accountable person. The parties had agreed that the respondent would be the most appropriate given it was under a repairing obligation in relation to the structure and exterior surfaces of the majority of the building and the common parts generally within related floors, which was consistent with the provisions and purpose of Part IV of the BSA [17-18].
R:
Relevant Defect
Grey GR Limited Partnership v Edgewater (Stevenage) Limited & Ors (Vista Towers) (2025) 218 ConLR 66 (FTT) (CAM/26UH/HYI/2023/0003): A “Relevant defect” for the purpose of s120 of the BSA was not confined to cases of non-compliance with the Building Regulations [68].
Relevant Landlord
Mirchandani v Java Properties International LLP [2025] (FTT) (LON/00AE/BSA/2024/0007, 0500 and 0502): Under s123(3) of the BSA (for the purpose of an RO application), a “relevant landlord” was a “landlord under a lease of the building, who is required, under the lease or by virtue of an enactment, to repair or maintain anything relating to the relevant defect”. Section 123(3) required the landlord to have a repairing obligation, and a landlord had no such obligation where management functions had been transferred to an RTM company by virtue of s96 of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002.
Relevant Liability (s130, BLO)
Willmott Dixon Construction Ltd v Prater (2024) 214 Con LR 164: Whether there was a “relevant liability” within the meaning of s130 of the BSA might not simply be a matter of law or one that flows inexorably from judgment in the main claim [18], [21], [22], [24], [25].
Remediation Contribution Order (s124)
Arjun Batish & Ors v Inspired Sutton Limited & Ors (FTT) (LON/00BF/ HYI/2022/0002): It was just and equitable to make an RCO if the lessees paid for the cost of works which ought to have been met by the respondent. An RCO could be made in relation to service charge costs incurred and paid prior to s124 and Schedule 8 coming into force [48 - 50]. Triathlon Homes LLP v Stratford Village Development Partnership & Ors (FTT) (LON/00BB/HYI/2022/ 0018-22): An RCO could be made in respect of costs incurred before 28 June 2022 [73] and in respect of costs incurred in preventing risks from materialising or reducing the severity of building safety incidents (such as a walking watch) [122].
Remediation Contribution Order (s27A Landlord and Tenant Act 1985)
St John Street Property Services Limited v Riverside Group Limited (FTT) (LON/00AU/LSC/2021/0255): The potential availability of an RCO was not taken into account when determining whether a social housing lessee was required to pay a service charge pursuant to s27A(1) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 in respect of cladding remediation costs, even where there were strong grounds for such an application, in circumstances where an application had not yet been made. It could not be said that the prospect of an RCO being made meant that the service charges otherwise payable were not reasonable or should be reduced [161 – 165].
Remediation Order (s123)
White & Ors v Kedai Limited (FTT) (LON/00AY/HYI/2022/0005 & 0016): The focus of the BSA was on building safety and the improvement of standards. There was no guidance in the BSA as to how the FTT should assess the risk to the safety of people in or about the building, or the scope of the works required to remedy relevant defects, or the standard to which remedial works should be carried out. The wording of the BSA was in deliberately broad terms, to enable the FTT to find the best and most practical, outcomes-focused solutions to myriad circumstances [66] [77]. It was an evidencedbased exercise, led predominantly by inspection reports and expert evidence, but also informed by the FTT’s own experience and expertise. Once the FTT determined that relevant defects existed, it was for the Tribunal to make an order to remedy those defects within a specified time [81].
SoS v Grey GR Limited Partnership (Vista Tower) (FTT) (CAM/26UH/ HYI/2022/0004): Remediation Order made even though works had started. The Tribunal had both the power and a discretion as to whether to make a Remediation Order [117]. It was not difficult to image circumstances in which experts and leaseholders agreed that some relevant defects remaining in a building represented a tolerable risk relative to the difficulty of remedying them [119]. A Remediation Order was a novel remedy. The focus was on remediation of lifethreatening building safety defects in tall residential buildings rather than redress for non-compliance with a legal obligation. If the prequalification criteria were met and there were relevant defects, it was likely that the Tribunal would make an order, subject to the facts of each case. The facts of the case, the works required and the situation of the parties were more relevant to the exercise of discretion than unreasonable delay or political motivation [121-122].
SoS v Grey GR Limited (Chocolate Box) (FTT) (CHI/00HN/ HYI/2023/0008): The approach to the exercise of discretion cannot be far from “just and equitable”. Given that “equitable” essentially means fair, the test cannot be far from one of justice and fairness [255].
Li Jing v Avon Ground Rents Limited (FTT) (LON/00BK/BSA/2024/0004): If satisfied that the statutory criteria in s123 BSA are met, the Tribunal’s starting point was that a Remediation Order should be made: other considerations were secondary [149 - 150].
Blomfield & Ors v Monier Road Limited (Smoke House) (FTT) (LON/00BG/HYI/2023/0024): The Tribunal had no power under s123 to specify which materials or contractors were to be utilised in the remedial works [48] [55].
SoS v Grey GR Limited Partnership (Focus Apartments) (FTT) (CAN/42UD/HYI/2023/0007): A Remediation Order served as “a backstop”, reassuring the applicant and leaseholders that the remaining remedial works would be carried out within a reasonable time [18]. Given the inherent risks (or probabilities) of delay in construction projects it was unrealistic to place a deadline that was the same or shortly after the estimated completion date. A deadline of six months after the estimated completion date was imposed [26-28].
Responsible Actors Scheme
R (on the application of Rydon Group Holdings Limited) v Secretary of State for Levelling Up Housing and Communities [2025] EWHC 3234 (Admin): there was an arguable case with a realistic prospect of success that decisions made by the SoS in relation to the Responsible Actors Scheme, established by Regulation 5 of the Building Safety (Responsible Actors Schemes and Prohibitions) Regulations 2023 (which were made in exercise of the powers conferred by ss126, 127, 128, 129 and 168 of the BSA), were amenable to judicial review [25] [62].
Responsible Landlord
Triathlon Homes LLP v Stratford Village Development Partnership & Ors (FTT) (LON/00BB/HYI/2022/0018- 22): Any landlord (or any right to manage company or leaseholder owned management company) which paid or was liable to pay the costs of a relevant measure which would have been recoverable from leaseholders but for paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 8, had the right to pass those costs on to a “responsible landlord” pursuant to regulation 3 of Thec Building Safety (Leaseholder Protections) (Information etc) Regulations 2022. The recipient of such a notice could appeal to the FTT, but only on the limited grounds that they were not a responsible landlord or that the sum claimed was more than the cost incurred. There was no right of appeal on the ground that it was not just and equitable for the responsible landlord to have to pay [39].
S:
Schedule 8
Lehner v Lant Street Management Company Limited (UT) [2024] UKTU 0135 (LC): A headline list of questions a decision maker should address when determining whether service charges were payable in respect of work to which the leaseholder provisions may apply were set out at [45]. On the facts, the lease was a qualifying lease and the leaseholder was not liable to pay the service charges as they related to cladding remediation.
Schedule 8 (legal or other professional services)
Adriatic Land 5 Ltd v Long Leaseholders at Hippersley Point [2023] UKUT 271 (LC): Paragraph 9 of Schedule 8 provided protection against service charges which would otherwise be payable in respect of legal or other professional services relating to the liability or potential liability of any person incurred as a result of a relevant defect, including the cost of obtaining legal advice, or in connection with proceedings before a court or tribunal, arbitration or mediation.
Schedule 8 (retrospective effect)
Adriatic Land 3 Limited v Residential Leaseholders of Waterside Apartments (FTT) (MAN/30UG/LSC/2021/044): The provisions of Schedule 8 did not restrict a leaseholder’s liability for service charges incurred, demanded and paid before 28 June 2022 [13]. Adriatic Land 5 Limited v The Long Leaseholders at Hippersley Point (UT) [2023] UKUT 271 (LC) (appeal outstanding, see [2024] EWCA Civ 1381): From 28 June 2022, no service charge was payable in respect of Qualifying Services, regardless of when the costs were incurred or when the relevant service charge became due [160, 165, 170].
Specified Building
BDW Trading Ltd v Ardmore Construction Ltd & Ors (2025) 219 ConLR 1: A BLO concerned a relevant liability “relating to a specified building” (s130(2)). Therefore, a BLO could not make associated companies liable for the entire liability of the original body across a number of developments. Discrete orders would need to be made [13, obiter].
Storey
Blomfield & Ors v Monier Road Limited (Smoke House) (FTT) (LON/00BG/HYI/2023/0024): A rooftop garden was a “storey”, such that the building was a higher risk building under BSA Part IV [62]. Government guidance (which suggested a garden was not a storey) was not followed, and did not constitute a reliable method of interpretation of law [74]. (NB. The Government’s webpage states that the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government is currently consulting relevant stakeholders on a proposal to amend the Higher-Risk Buildings (Descriptions and Supplementary Provisions) Regulations to make clear that roof gardens should not be considered a storey: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/ criteria-for-determining-whether-anexisting-building-is-a-higher-riskbuilding-during-building-work
T:
Timing (BLO application)
Nothing in s130 BSA made it a precondition to the making of a BLO that the relevant liability of the “original body” (s130(2) BSA) needed to already have been established. BLO applications could be made before the trial of the original body’s liability, could proceed in tandem with the litigation against the original body or, in a given case, be convenient to defer consideration until after trial against the original body (BDW Trading Ltd v Ardmore Construction Ltd & Ors (2025) 219 ConLR 1 [14, obiter]; Willmott Dixon Construction Ltd v Prater [2024] EWHC 1190 (TCC), 214 ConLR 164; 381 Southwark Park Road RTM Company Limited v Click St. Andrews Limited [2024] EWHC 3179 (TCC)).
