A
Accountable person (higher-risk building)
(UTT) Unsdorfer v Octagon [2024] UKUT 59 (LC): For the purpose of s72(1) of the BSA an “accountable person” for a higher-risk building did not include a manager appointed under section 24 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987. By virtue of s72(2) of the BSA, most RTM companies were an accountable person.
Ancillary orders
Lessees of flats at 419 High Road, Space Apartments, N22 8JS v Avon Ground Rents Ltd (FTT) (LON/00AP/ HYI/2022/0017): Ancillary orders, necessary to make a s123 Remediation Order effective and workable, could be made by the Tribunal [74].
Associated (s124/125, s121)
Triathlon Homes LLP v Stratford Village Development Partnership & Ors (FTT) (LON/00BB/HYI/2022/0018 22): An associate might exist between beneficiaries of a trust and their trustees, between current and former partners and their partnerships, between directors and their companies, and between companies with common directors or controlling interests [38] (not overturned on appeal). Edgewater (Stevenage) Limited & Ors v Grey GR Limited Partnership (Vista Tower) (UTT) [2026] UKUT 18 (LC): There was no doubt that the obvious purpose of the associated person provisions in paragraph (d) was to address the problem of special purpose vehicles being used as developers which were either thinly capitalised or were wound up once the relevant development project had been completed. Such associated persons included parent companies which were run through special purpose vehicles which were thinly capitalised or since wound up [189]. Triathlon was an “easy case” with a thinly capitalised developer, and a wealthy parent company, which was a “classic case” for making an RCO against both parties [191].
Associated (s130(4), s131)
381 Southwark Park Road RTM Company Limited & Ors v Click St Andrew Limited (In Liquidation) & Anor (2025) 219 Con LR 29: Click Group Holdings controlled or did control Click St Andrews within the meaning of s131(4) of the BSA because Click Group Holdings held all the shares of Click Above Limited and Click St Andrews was a wholly owned subsidiary of Click Above Limited. Holdings controlled Click St Andrews indirectly in the sense that it was able, through the corporate structure, to secure that the affairs of Click St Andrews were conducted in accordance with its wishes [7]. BDW Trading Ltd v Ardmore Construction Ltd & Ors (2025) 219 ConLR 1: For the purpose of s131 BSA the precise and carefully confined definition of “associate” was relatively extensive on account of the definition of “the relevant period” [13, obiter].
B
Building Liability Order
Crest Nicholson v Ardmore [2026] EWHC 789 (TCC): A BLO can be granted before liability is finally determined and an adjudicator’s decision can be a “relevant liability” for the purpose of a BLO [125]-[214].
Building Liability Order (Quantification)
381 Southwark Park Road RTM Company Limited & Ors v Click St Andrew Limited (In Liquidation) & Anor (2025) 219 Con LR 29: the Court was not required to quantify the relevant liability at the point of making a BLO, particularly in circumstances where the Court had no figures to enable it to do so [29].
Building Safety Fund (s123)
SoS v Grey GR Limited (Chocolate Box) (FTT) (CHI/00HN/HYI/2023/0008): The obligation on a landlord to undertake BSA works did not only arise on receipt of BSF funding. There was no hint in the statutory provisions that funding played any part. A failure to make progress on BSA works due to seeking funding weighed heavily when considering whether to make a Remediation Order [259].
Building Safety Fund (s124)
Triathlon Homes LLP v Stratford Village Development Partnership & Ors [2025] EWCA Civ 846: The FTT was justified in concluding that as between the parties listed in section 124 of the BSA and the public purse as potential contributors to the works, public funding was to be seen as a matter of last resort. There was no reason to think that the Building Safety Fund was intended to displace the provisions of the BSA. In practical terms, this meant that if it was prima facie just and equitable to grant an RCO, that works were funded was not a reason not to make an RCO. However, there may be cases where it would not be just and equitable to make an RCO against those in s124(3), even if the result was to leave the costs to be funded by the public. [61-65, 88].
Building Safety Risk (s120(5))
Edgewater (Stevenage) Limited & Ors v Grey GR Limited Partnership (Vista Tower) (UTT) [2026] UKUT 18 (LC): A building safety risk could not exist unless there was a defect in relation to a relevant building which had caused that building safety risk [240]. It was difficult to see a justification for imposing any kind of external gradation or limit on the level of risk which was capable of qualifying the reference to “a risk” in the definition of building safety risk. There was no qualifying adjective in s120(5) such as “significant” or “intolerable” or “low”. A risk meant any risk [241] (a wider definition than given by the FTT at [72]).
Building Safety Risk (s130(3)(b))
381 Southwark Park Road RTM Co Ltd v Click St Andrews Ltd (2024) 218 Con LR 258: Breaches relating to fire and structure posed a building safety risk within the meaning of s130(3)(b) of the BSA [198], [219].
C
Cladding remediation (Schedule 8, paragraph 8)
Adriatic Land 5 Limited v The Long Leaseholders at Hippersley Point (2025) 221 Con LR 17 (CA): Leaseholders with qualifying leases do not have to pay any service charges in respect of cladding remediation by application of paragraph 8 of schedule 8. This applied even if the landlord did not meet the contribution condition. This implemented the Secretary of State’s announcement that no leaseholder living in their own flat “would pay a penny to fix dangerous cladding” [170].
Almacantar Centre Point Nominee No 1 Ltd & Anor v Penelope de Valk & Ors (UTT) [2025] UKUT 298 (LC): Paragraph 8 of Schedule 8 applied to defective cladding that was not also a “relevant defect” within the meaning of s120 BSA [50]. The words of Paragraph 8 were clear and ambiguous, and accorded with the underlying policy of the BSA and reflected the clear ministerial statement that no leaseholder living in their own flat would pay a penny to fix dangerous cladding [51]. Paragraph 8 provided a different protection to sections 116 to 124 and the remainder of Schedule 8, for a limited group of qualifying leaseholders where the relevant building had “unsafe cladding”. The BSA did not contain a definition of “cladding”. Whether a building included cladding was one of fact [69]. There was no justification for the UT departing from the FTT’s finding that the façade was “cladding” for the purpose of the BSA [69-70]. The “cladding system” was the outer wall of an external wall system. There was no justification for limiting paragraph 8 to structures with two separate systems and would not be met if there had only been one composite wall [74-75]. The word “unsafe” meant something more than simply out of repair, and encompassed a range of threats to the safety of the building, or its residents or nearby members of the public. It was not limited to “fire risks” [81]. (NB. Permission to appeal to CoA has been granted).
Contribution (s149)
Mulalley & Co v Sto Limited (2026) 226 ConLR 343 (TCC): the just and equitable contribution between a contractor and the manufacturer and supplier of an unsafe external cladding system was 12.5% (contractor) to 87.5% (manufacturer and supplier) [21]. The principal cause of the remedial works was the fact that Sto marketed and supplied an inherently defective product [20].
Corporate Veil
Grey GR Limited Partnership v Edgewater (Stevenage) Limited & Ors (Vista Tower) (2025) 218 ConLR 66 (FTT) (CAM/26UH/HYI/2023/0003): The power to make RCOs against associated companies was a radical departure from normal company law, but it did not pierce the corporate veil because it did not expose the individual members to unlimited personal liability [351] (not considered on appeal to the UT); Triathlon Homes LLP v Stratford Village Development Partnership & Ors [2025] EWCA Civ 846: That the beneficial owners of the respondent companies had changed was not relevant: if you invested in a company, you took the risk of unforeseen liabilities attaching to that company [118].
Costs
Grey GR Limited Partnership v Edgewater (Stevenage) Limited & Ors (Vista Tower) (2025) 218 ConLR 66 (FTT) (CAM/26UH/HYI/2023/0003): The tribunal was not generally a cost-shifting jurisdiction and should not be taken to be encouraging a costs application in the context of an RCO [389] (not considered on appeal to the UT). Adriatic Land 5 Limited v The Long Leaseholders at Hippersley Point (2025) 221 Con LR 17 (CA): Paragraph 9 of Schedule 8 provided protection against service charges which would otherwise be payable in respect of legal or other professional services relating to the liability or potential liability of any person incurred as a result of a relevant defect, including the cost of obtaining legal advice, or in connection with proceedings before a court or tribunal, arbitration or mediation. Such protection extended to the costs of a dispensation application under section 20ZA of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 [44-47]. Legal and professional costs were a certain category of costs that Parliament decided should not be claimable at all from leaseholders with qualifying leases [172].
D
Developer
Grey GR Limited Partnership v Edgewater (Stevenage) Limited & Ors (Vista Tower) (2025) 218 ConLR 66 (FTT) (CAM/26UH/HYI/2023/0003): The developer was a key target of an RCO, at the top of the hierarchy of liability [232, 350] (not considered on appeal to the UT). Triathlon Homes LLP v Stratford Village Development Partnership [2025] EWCA Civ 846: The policy of the BSA is that primary responsibility for the costs of rectification works should fall on the original developer [69]. A developer responsible for the defect who retains an interest in the building should stand at the top of the hierarchy or cascade of those who will pick up the costs [87]. Damages for defective works Wilson v HB (SWA) Ltd [2025] 4 WLR 114 (CA): A summary of principles to be applied by the court when assessing damages for defective works [25] [74-75].
E
Explanatory Notes
Adriatic Land 5 Limited v The Long Leaseholders at Hippersley Point (2025) 221 Con LR 17 (CA): The Explanatory Notes to the BSA were not in the same terms as those in respect of the Bill [34]. A distinction had to be drawn between explanatory notes which were available when the legislation was being enacted and those which had come into existence subsequently. Where explanatory notes in respect of a statute did not exist when it was being passed (as was the case for the BSA), there was less reason to see them as a guide to Parliament’s intention [66-67]. The notes may be of persuasive authority, but they did not enjoy any particular legal status and could be compared with academic writings [70]. Edgewater (Stevenage) Limited & Ors v Grey GR Limited Partnership (Vista Tower) (UTT) [2026] UKUT 18 (LC): Explanatory Notes could, at best, play only a secondary role in the process of construction. There was a distinction to be drawn between explanatory notes available when the relevant legislation was being enacted, and those which came into existence subsequently. In the latter case there was less reason to see the explanatory notes as a guide to Parliament’s intention [98].
I
Impecuniosity
Grey GR Limited Partnership v Edgewater (Stevenage) Limited & Ors (Vista Tower) (2025) 218 ConLR 66 (FTT) (CAM/26UH/ HYI/2023/0003): Impecuniosity was not a significant reason for or against making an RCO [352] (not considered on appeal to the UT).
Information Order (Respondent)
BDW Trading Ltd v Ardmore Construction Ltd & Ors (2025) 219 ConLR 1: An IO can only be made against the “original body” which had a relevant liability, and not an associated company, which was contrary to the example in the BSA Explanatory Notes [17].
Information Order (Relevant Liability)
BDW Trading Ltd v Ardmore Construction Ltd & Ors (2025) 219 ConLR 1: Information Orders under s132 BSA may only be made where “it appears to the court… that the body corporate is subject to a relevant liability”. It was not necessary to have already established liability (albeit there was no difficulty if had been by judgment, award, adjudication decision or admission) but potential liability was not sufficient. There should be no question at all of adopting anything like trial procedures to determine the question – applications should be short and uncomplicated. IOs might be made sparingly where liability was in issue [25, 27, 29].
Information Order (Scope)
BDW Trading Ltd v Ardmore Construction Ltd & Ors (2025) 219 ConLR 1: Information and documents to enable the applicant to identify associates of the respondent. In appropriate cases, also matters concerning the financial position of the associate [40, obiter].
Insurance
Tobias & Ors v Grosvenor Freeholds Limited (The Central) (FTT) (LON/ 00AG/BSA/2024/0008): The potential availability of Premier Guarantee insurance in respect of “relevant defects” was not given significant weight by the FTT when exercising its discretion to make a remediation order.
Interest
Helpfavour Limited & Ors v Rosco Ingo Limited & Anr (1-9 Planetree Path) (FTT) (LON/00BH/ BSB/2024/0500): The FTT had no statutory power provided by the BSA or otherwise to award interest in the context of a RCO application [68-70].
J
Joint and several liability (RCO)
Edgewater (Stevenage) Limited & Ors v Grey GR Limited Partnership (Vista Tower) (UTT) [2026] UKUT 18 (LC): The FTT had power impose joint and several liability upon multiple respondents if the FTT considered it was just and equitable to take that course [137-146] [149] [160] [165] [167]. Section 124 created a new form of statutory liability, in respect of which Parliament had not concerned itself with the question of rights of contribution as between respondents to an RCO [158]. However, the issue was most likely to arise where the FTT was persuaded that associated parties should be brought into the liability, through the gateway of s124(3)(d) and in such a case, by definition, there was an element of association which might make it reasonable for the respondents to sort out contributions between themselves. Further, before making such an order, the FTT would need to be satisfied that it was just and equitable to impose joint and several liability, which was likely to require a degree of linkage between the respondents that rendered it reasonable to leave them to sort out contribution between themselves. The FTT could consider issues of alleged unfairness and/or problems in considering the just and equitable question [159].
Joint case management
Wallace Estates v Durkan Estates [2026] EWHC 2133 (TCC)/LON/ 00AH/BSB/2025/0611: With an RCO application before the FTT and a related contractual dispute (over termination of a remediation agreement) before the TCC arising from the same defects, Constable J sat alongside the FTT’s President for the first time to approve joint case management and an eventual joint trial [1], [22]. The court left open how the two jurisdictions’ differing appeal routes will ultimately be reconciled [37].
Just and Equitable (s124)
Triathlon Homes LLP v Stratford Village Development Partnership & Ors [2025] EWCA Civ 846: It was a “generous ambit of discretion” entrusted to the FTT [121]. There may be cases where it would not be just and equitable to make an RCO against those falling within s124(3), even if the result was to leave the costs to be funded by the public [61-65]. The fact that costs could in principle be claimed under regulation 3 of the 2022 regulations (which was not a discretionary matter) was a factor of considerable weight in deciding whether it was just and equitable to make an RCO [71]. The motivation of the applicant was not relevant, so long as it was an “interested party” within the meaning of the BSA [78]. A developer responsible for the defect who retains an interest in the building should stand at the top of the hierarchy or cascade of those who will pick up the costs [87].
Grey GR Limited Partnership v Edgewater (Stevenage) Limited & Ors (Vista Tower) (2025) 218 ConLR 66 (FTT) (CAM/26UH/HYI/2023/0003): The s124 BSA just and equitable test was deliberately wide so that money could be found. The jurisdiction may be protean. It was helpful to ask whether the relevant remedial works/ costs were within a reasonable range of responses [83, 349] (not specifically challenged on appeal).
Zampetti v Fairhold Athena Ltd (Empire Square) 221 Con. L.R. 160: The Tribunal considered relevant factors to determine what was just and equitable. This was a wider test than the principles found in section 27A of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 [142]. A relevant consideration was that the Tribunal found that the waking watch was a necessary measure [143]. The fact that a respondent had the deepest pockets was not a factor in isolation; it was more pertinent that the respondent was also responsible for the construction of the Building [144].
Edgewater (Stevenage) Limited & Ors v Grey GR Limited Partnership (Vista Tower) (UTT) [2026] UKUT 18 (LC): Given the breadth of the just and equitable jurisdiction, the Tribunal might take into account the risk of a respondent becoming insolvent in deciding which respondent(s) should be subject to an RCO, in order to avoid the risk of a shortfall in recovery [146]. The UT could not interfere with a determination of the FTT that it was just and equitable to make an RCO unless it concluded that the FTT had gone wrong in the exercise of their discretion in such a way as to vitiate the exercise of that discretion [171]. There had to be something more than satisfaction of the gateway conditions before the FTT could be satisfied that it was just and equitable to make an RCO [179]. It was not possible or sensible to seek to catalogue the factors upon which the FTT could rely in determining whether it was just and equitable to make the order sought [180]. The initial burden was on the applicant to put forward a case as to why it was just and equitable to make the order, but it was for the respondent(s) to prove those matters on which they relied in opposition [182]. The FTT had not treated the fact of association as sufficient to justifying the making of an RCO: they had addressed the just and equitable question [199]. On the particular facts, the fair approach was an all or nothing one [210]. A primary purpose of s124 was to ensure that a wealthy parent company or other wealthy entity caught by the association provisions could not evade responsibility by hiding behind a separate personality: if required, there was a clear or rational nexus between the relevant body corporate and the imposition of the RCO [217]. Participation in the development or receipt (direct or indirect) of remuneration from the development was not a minimum requirement for it being just and equitable to make an RCO, but could be taken into account [219, 220].
Just and Equitable (s130)
381 Southwark Park Road RTM Company Limited & Ors v Click St Andrew Limited (In Liquidation) & Anor (2025) 219 Con LR 29: FTT considerations in Triathlon Homes LLP considered [9-15]. The indicators were in favour of making an order in respect of the holding company, because it was the holding company and had a common directing mind [15, 25]. However, a BLO must only relate to a relevant liability within the meaning of the BSA, and was not a “gateway” to the recovery of all losses [26-28].
L
Landlord
Triathlon Homes LLP v Stratford Village Development Partnership & Ors [2025] EWCA Civ 846: The effect of paragraph 2 of Schedule 8 of the BSA and Regulation 3 of the 2022 Regulations taken together is that were the original developer (or its associate) retains (or retained as at 14 February 2022) an interest in the building in question, lessees do not have to pay the service charges, and any other landlord who ends up bearing the cost as a result can pass that liability to the landlord-developer or the landlord that is an associate of the developer. Unlike s124 of the BSA, regulation 3 is not a discretionary matter: regulation 3(2) provides that where the regulation applies, the responsible landlord “is liable to pay”. Recovery is triggered by the claiming landlord simply service a notice specifying the amount (regulation 3(3)). The recipient of a notice may appeal to the FTT but only on very limited grounds, namely that the remediation amount does not represent the cost of the relevant measure, or that the recipient is not a responsible landlord (regulations 3(5) and (6)) [69].
Landlord’s Certificate
Will & Anor v G&O Properties (FTT) (LON/00AT/HYI/2022/0003): The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make an order determining whether a relevant landlord had failed to comply with the requirement to provide a Landlord’s Certificate confirming whether or not the landlord met the contribution condition (ie a net worth of £2,000,000) and/or whether or not they (or an associate) were responsible for a relevant defect, as required by the Building Safety (Leaseholder Protections) (England) Regulations 2022.
Leaseholders
Adriatic Land 5 Limited v The Long Leaseholders at Hippersley Point (2025) 221 Con LR 17 (CA): The BSA remediation provisions amounted to a very significant intervention by Parliament in the typical and familiar contractual scheme applicable to a block of flats. By protecting leaseholders from the significant costs that they would otherwise have to bear, the remediation provisions undoubtedly cause very substantial disruption to the contractual allocation of risk. That costs which would otherwise have fallen on the leaseholders have to be borne by someone else (including landlords who may be as blameless for the original defects as the leaseholders) was a necessary consequence of Parliament’s decision to relieve leaseholders of such costs [163]. The focus of the protections was squarely on individual leaseholders living in their flats: leaseholders with larger portfolios were left to bear the costs as per the contractual provisions for service charges in their leases [167].
Legal and professional costs
Adriatic Land 5 Limited v The Long Leaseholders at Hippersley Point (2025) 221 Con LR 17 (CA): Paragraph 9 of Schedule 8 provided protection against service charges which would otherwise be payable in respect of legal or other professional services relating to the liability or potential liability of any person incurred as a result of a relevant defect, including the cost of obtaining legal advice, or in connection with proceedings before a court or tribunal, arbitration or mediation. Such protection extended to the costs of a dispensation application under section 20ZA of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 [44-47]. Legal and professional costs were a certain category of costs that Parliament decided should not be claimable at all from leaseholders with qualifying leases [172].
Limitation (s135)
BDW Trading Ltd v URS Corporation Ltd (2025) 220 Con LR 1 (SC): The retrospective limitation period established by section 135 of the BSA was not restricted to actions brought under s1 Defective Premises Act 1972, but could equally apply to actions merely dependent on s1, such as a claim for damages in negligence or for contribution [103, 113, 114, 163, 295, 297, 304]. (Obiter) The retrospective limitation period did not apply to s2A of the Defective Premises Act 1972 because it was not a “relevant provision” already in force [269].
P
Parties (to main claim, BLO)
Willmott Dixon Construction Ltd v Prater (2024) 214 Con LR 164: the BSA did not require a party against whom a Building Liability Order (s130) is sought to be made a party to the main claim/substantive claim, or to participate in those proceedings. However, if a BLO was contemplated it would generally be sensible and efficient for the party against whom the order was sought to be made a party and for the BLO application to be heard together with the main claim [17], [18], [21], [22], [24], [25]. In 381 Southwark Park Road RTM Co Ltd v Click St Andrews Ltd (2024) 218 Con LR 258 the Court confirmed that there was no requirement on a party to claim a BLO within existing proceedings: “the circumstances in which it might be just and equitable to make the order may not arise until after proceedings to establish a relevant liability are concluded and a BLO could be sought against a corporate body that did not even exist at the time of those proceedings” [31].
Prejudice (s123)
Lessees of flats at 419 High Road, Space Apartments, N22 8JS v Avon Ground Rents Ltd (FTT) (LON/00AP/ HYI/2022/0017): Where a respondent to a claim for a Remediation Order pursuant to s123 BSA engaged with the process and was willing to complete works the Tribunal considered the balance of prejudice which would be caused by, on the one hand, making the order and, on the other hand, not making it. The Tribunal concluded that the greater prejudice would be caused to the lessees if no order were made [59-64].
Principal Accountable Person (ss73 and 75)
Brompton Estates Nominees No.1 Limited & Anor v Wall Properties Limited (FTT) (LON/00AW/ BSG/2024/0001): There was no guidance in the BSA as to how the Tribunal was to determine which accountable person was appropriate to be the principal accountable person. The parties had agreed that the respondent would be the most appropriate given it was under a repairing obligation in relation to the structure and exterior surfaces of the majority of the building and the common parts generally within related floors, which was consistent with the provisions and purpose of Part IV of the BSA [17-18].
Purpose
BDW Trading Ltd v URS Corporation Ltd (2025) 220 Con LR 1 (SC): A central purpose and policy of the BSA in general, and section 135 in particular, was to hold those responsible for building safety defects accountable [104, 106].
R
Regulation 3 Notices
Stratford Village Property Holdings v East Village Management (FTT): the FTT can rule on Reg.3’s application [36], the “but-for” recoverability test looks only at lease-term payability (not reasonableness or funding conditions) [50], liability to pay must be unconditional and Reg.3 operates retrospectively [93]. (NB. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal has since been granted).
Relevant Building (s.117)
A2Dominion South Ltd v BDW Trading Ltd (FTT: LON/00AT/BSB/2025/0608). A four-storey section of a mixed development (Flats 29-40) formed part of the same “relevant building” as the adjoining seven-storey section (Flats 1-28), given their structural interdependence via a shared stair core and transfer beams [16], [100]-[102] [124]-[128] and the shared electrical and water services [149], [153]. Flats 29-40 were therefore brought within the RCO application [155].
Relevant Defect
Waite v Kedai (FTT) LON/00AY/ HYI/2022/0005 and 0016: Whether something is a relevant defect was to be assessed at the date of the FTT hearing [75]. Whether or not works or construction complied with the then extant Building Regulations in force at the time was not the relevant question. Instead, the correct question was whether there was a defect that caused a building safety risk in the light of today’s knowledge [75 and 80]. Grey GR Limited Partnership v Edgewater (Stevenage) Limited & Ors (Vista Tower) (2025) 218 ConLR 66 (FTT) (CAM/26UH/HYI/2023/0003): A “relevant defect” for the purpose of s120 of the BSA was not confined to cases of non-compliance with the Building Regulations [68] (not the subject of the subsequent appeal, but the UTT wished to “note” that the FTT concluded that non-compliance with the building regulations was “merely one way, and not the only way, in which something could be a defect for the purposes of the Act” [2026] UKUT 18 (LC) at [35]). Barclays Nominees (George Yard) Ltd v LDC (Oxford Road Bournemouth) Ltd (2025) 220 ConLR 105 (FTT): A cost-risk analysis was not relevant in determining whether or not there was a “relevant defect” [227]. SoS v Canary Riverside Estate Management Ltd (LON/00BG/BSA/2024/0005 & LON/00BG/BSB/2024/009): The relevant date for assessing whether something was a relevant defect was the date of the FTT hearing [30]. There was no threshold in s120, and words such as “tolerable”, “low” or “medium” were noticeably absent: the adoption of such language as a threshold test was unwarranted [37]. The FTT was to identify whether, at the date of the hearing, and in the light of current knowledge, there were defects present at the building that constituted a risk to the safety of people in or about the building arising from the spread of fire, or collapse of the building, or any part of it. It was not appropriate to assess the degree of that risk, nor whether the risk exceeded that ordinarily present in a building of the given nature [38]. The degree of risk was relevant to remediation [42]. A Tribunal might decide that it was not just and equitable to make an RCO in respect of costs incurred in remedying a relevant defect where it considered those costs were unnecessarily incurred [43]. SoS for HCLG v EDR Builders Ltd (Hallings Wharf) (2026) 226 Con LR 48: Whether something is a “defect” is not to be assessed by reference to Building Regulations in existence at the time of construction – they might have been complied with but there is still a ‘risk’ to the health of people in or about the building [32].
Relevant Landlord
Mirchandani v Java Properties International LLP [2025] (FTT) (LON/00AE/BSA/2024/0007, 0500 and 0502): Under s123(3) of the BSA (for the purpose of an RO application), a “relevant landlord” was a “landlord under a lease of the building, who is required, under the lease or by virtue of an enactment, to repair or maintain anything relating to the relevant defect”. Section 123(3) required the landlord to have a repairing obligation, and a landlord had no such obligation where management functions had been transferred to an RTM company by virtue of s96 of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002. Adriatic Land 5 Limited v The Long Leaseholders at Hippersley Point (2025) 221 Con LR 17 (CA): If the person responsible for the defect (the developer or the person who commissioned the works), or someone associated with them, retained an interest in the building, they had to bear the costs of dealing with the defect by application of paragraph 2 of Schedule 8, which provided that if a relevant landlord was responsible for the defect, no service charge was payable in respect of a relevant measure. This applied whether or not the lease in question was a qualifying lease [165].
Relevant Liability (s130, BLO)
Willmott Dixon Construction Ltd v Prater (2024) 214 Con LR 164: Whether there was a “relevant liability” within the meaning of s130 of the BSA might not simply be a matter of law or one that flows inexorably from judgment in the main claim [18], [21], [22], [24], [25].
Remediation Contribution Order (s124)
Arjun Batish & Ors v Inspired Sutton Limited & Ors (FTT) (LON/00BF/ HYI/2022/0002): It was just and equitable to make an RCO if the lessees paid for the cost of works which ought to have been met by the respondent. An RCO could be made in relation to service charge costs incurred and paid prior to s124 and Schedule 8 coming into force [48-50]. Triathlon Homes LLP v Stratford Village Development Partnership & Ors [2025] EWCA Civ 846: It was necessary to interpret s124 by reference to the purposes of Part 5 of the BSA, which included the protection of leaseholders from financial risk, or to ensure that risks from historical defects were remedied without the leaseholders having to bear the potentially very large costs [151]. An RCO could be made in respect of costs incurred before 28 June 2022 [155]. Adriatic Land 5 Limited v The Long Leaseholders at Hippersley Point (2025) 221 Con LR 17 (CA): An RCO could be made against the landlord to whom service charges had been paid in respect of costs incurred by the landlord in connection with work to remedy relevant defects (Newey LJ at [85(vii)]).
Remediation Contribution Order (costs in remedying or otherwise in connection with)
Triathlon Homes LLP v Stratford Village Development Partnership & Ors (FTT) (LON/00BB/HYI/2022/0018 22): Remedy and its variants was readily capable of being applied to measures short of eliminating the existence of a defect altogether [103]. The interpretation of s124 should focus on the practical outcome of the things done or to be done rather than any interpretation which tends to narrow its scope [106]. Flats 1-14, 171 Tower Bridge Road, London SE1 2AW (FTT) LON/00BE/LSC/2023/0335 (‘Tower Bridge Road’): the words “in connection with” indicate that the provision is much wider than either just ‘for’ or ‘because of’ a relevant defect. There did not have to be certainty that there was a relevant defect or of liability in order for any professional report to be caught by the provision [51]. Zampetti v Fairhold Athena Ltd (Empire Square) (2025) 221 Con. L.R. 160: costs in this context could include legal costs associated with steps to achieve the listed outcomes and would otherwise fall to innocent parties [176, 192, 195, 196]. The phrase “in connection with” was a very wide term, consistent with the powers Parliament had seen fit to give the Tribunal generally [177]. The list of matters that might be relevant costs for an RCO in s124(2A) was not definitive and did not proscribe the Tribunal from finding that a class of costs was within its power to make an RCO that was not identified in the list [178]. SoS for HCLG v EDR Builders Ltd (Hallings Wharf) (2026) 226 Con LR 48: Where RCO sought after defects had been remedied, legal costs incurred in seeking RCO not incurred in connection with remedying the building and therefore it was doubtful that litigation costs were recoverable under s124 [146]. The inclusion of litigation costs in an RCO, without detailed particulars, was wholly impractical [132].
Remediation Contribution Order (specified amount)
Zampetti v Fairhold Athena Ltd (Empire Square) (2025) 221 Con. L.R. 160: The Tribunal undoubtedly had jurisdiction to make an order for reasonable costs if it was not presented with a specified amount [168].
Remediation Contribution Order (s27A Landlord and Tenant Act 1985)
St John Street Property Services Limited v Riverside Group Limited (FTT) (LON/00AU/LSC/2021/0255): The potential availability of an RCO was not taken into account when determining whether a social housing lessee was required to pay a service charge pursuant to s27A(1) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 in respect of cladding remediation costs, even where there were strong grounds for such an application, in circumstances where an application had not yet been made. It could not be said that the prospect of an RCO being made meant that the service charges otherwise payable were not reasonable or should be reduced [161-165].
Remediation Order (s123)
Waite & Ors v Kedai Limited (FTT) (2024) 210 ConLR 166: The focus of the BSA was on building safety and the improvement of standards. There was no guidance in the BSA as to how the FTT should assess the risk to the safety of people in or about the building, or the scope of the works required to remedy relevant defects, or the standard to which remedial works should be carried out. The wording of the BSA was in deliberately broad terms, to enable the FTT to find the best and most practical, outcomes-focused solutions to myriad circumstances [66] [77]. It was an evidenced-based exercise, led predominantly by inspection reports and expert evidence, but also informed by the FTT’s own experience and expertise. Once the FTT determined that relevant defects existed, it was for the Tribunal to make an order to remedy those defects within a specified time [81].
SoS v Grey GR Limited Partnership (Vista Tower) (FTT) (CAM/26UH/ HYI/2022/0004): Remediation Order made even though works had started. The Tribunal had both the power and a discretion as to whether to make a Remediation Order [117]. It was not difficult to image circumstances in which experts and leaseholders agreed that some relevant defects remaining in a building represented a tolerable risk relative to the difficulty of remedying them [119]. A Remediation Order was a novel remedy. The focus was on remediation of life-threatening building safety defects in tall residential buildings rather than redress for non compliance with a legal obligation. If the pre-qualification criteria were met and there were relevant defects, it was likely that the Tribunal would make an order, subject to the facts of each case. The facts of the case, the works required and the situation of the parties were more relevant to the exercise of discretion than unreasonable delay or political motivation [121-122] (not considered on appeal to the UT).
SoS v Grey GR Limited (Chocolate Box) (FTT) (CHI/00HN/HYI/2023/0008): The approach to the exercise of discretion cannot be far from “just and equitable”. Given that “equitable” essentially means fair, the test cannot be far from one of justice and fairness [255].
Li Jing v Avon Ground Rents Limited (FTT) (LON/00BK/BSA/2024/0004): If satisfied that the statutory criteria in s123 BSA are met, the Tribunal’s starting point was that a Remediation Order should be made: other considerations were secondary [149-150].
Monier Road Limited (Smoke House) Blomfield & Ors (2025) 220 ConLR 86 (UTT): The Tribunal had no power under s123 to specify which materials or contractors were to be utilised in the remedial works [49] [55].
SoS v Grey GR Limited Partnership (Focus Apartments) (FTT) (CAM/42UD/ HYI/2023/0007): A Remediation Order served as “a backstop”, reassuring the applicant and leaseholders that the remaining remedial works would be carried out within a reasonable time [18]. Given the inherent risks (or probabilities) of delay in construction projects it was unrealistic to place a deadline that was the same or shortly after the estimated completion date. A deadline of six months after the estimated completion date was imposed [26-28].
Barclays Nominees (George Yard) v LDC (Oxford Road Bournemouth) (2025) 220 ConLR 105 (FTT): An expert can and should offer opinion on whether or not something amounts to a relevant defect under the terms of the Act [211]. A Remediation Order was granted on the basis of evidence of defects requiring substantial remediation works, particularly in circumstances where the Respondent had been aware of the defects for 5 years but had not commenced works [239].
Zampetti v Fairhold Athena Ltd (Empire Square) (2025) 221 Con. L.R. 160: Departing from The Chocolate Box, the Tribunal is not satisfied that “fair and just” is the applicable test for making an RO [83]. The lack of any formulation of a test to apply to the otherwise unfettered discretion in s123 BSA was a deliberate choice by Parliament [85]. This part of the BSA was in deliberately broad terms to enable the Tribunal to find the best and most practical, outcomes focused solutions across a wide range of circumstances. The BSA was solution focused rather than blame focused, and was concerned with the building rather than the parties to the application. The Tribunal should ask itself what the best answer was in the application to achieve remediation of the relevant defects for the safety of 28 the leaseholders. The outcome of the assessment should be within a range of reasonable decisions, but would not be open to challenge unless no reasonable decision maker, on the facts known to it, could have come to the same decision. This test was qualitatively different from an argument that a decision was not just and equitable because of some key feature or behaviour of a party [85]. The fact that the respondent was the developer and responsible for the defects and had signed self-remediation terms was at best neutral on the RO. The context surrounding the willingness and progress towards the remediation were legitimate considerations that may take the position from one of neutrality to either positive or negative [89].
Remediation costs (s124, reasonable responses)
SoS for HCLG v EDR Builders Ltd (Hallings Wharf) (2026) 226 Con LR 48: provided the remediation carried out was within the band of reasonable responses, the fact it could have been done more cheaply was not of itself a basis for reducing the amount of an RCO [55].
Responsible Actors Scheme
R (on the application of Rydon Group Holdings Limited) v Secretary of State for Levelling Up Housing and Communities [2024] EWHC 3234 (Admin): there was an arguable case with a realistic prospect of success that decisions made by the SoS in relation to the Responsible Actors Scheme, established by Regulation 5 of the Building Safety (Responsible Actors Schemes and Prohibitions) Regulations 2023 (which were made in exercise of the powers conferred by ss126, 127, 128, 129 and 168 of the BSA), were amenable to judicial review [25] [62].
Responsible Landlord
Triathlon Homes LLP v Stratford Village Development Partnership & Ors (FTT) (LON/00BB/HYI/2022/0018 22): Any landlord (or any right to manage company or leaseholder owned management company) which paid or was liable to pay the costs of a relevant measure which would have been recoverable from leaseholders but for paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 8, had the right to pass those costs on to a “responsible landlord” pursuant to regulation 3 of The Building Safety (Leaseholder Protections) (Information etc) Regulations 2022. The recipient of such a notice could appeal to the FTT, but only on the limited grounds that they were not a responsible landlord or that the sum claimed was more than the cost incurred. There was no right of appeal on the ground that it was not just and equitable for the responsible landlord to have to pay [39] (not overturned on appeal).
S
Schedule 8
Lehner v Lant Street Management Company Limited (UT) [2024] UKUT 135 (LC): A headline list of questions a decision maker should address when determining whether service charges were payable in respect of work to which the leaseholder provisions may apply were set out at [45]. On the facts, the lease was a qualifying lease and the leaseholder was not liable to pay the service charges as they related to cladding remediation.
Schedule 8 (legal or other professional services)
Adriatic Land 5 Limited v The Long Leaseholders at Hippersley Point (2025) 221 Con LR 17 (CA): Paragraph 9 of Schedule 8 provided protection against service charges which would otherwise be payable in respect of legal or other professional services relating to the liability or potential liability of any person incurred as a result of a relevant defect, including the cost of obtaining legal advice, or in connection with proceedings before a court or tribunal, arbitration or mediation. Such protection extended to the costs of a dispensation application under section 20ZA of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 [44-47].
Schedule 8 (retrospective effect)
Adriatic Land 5 Limited v The Long Leaseholders at Hippersley Point (2025) 221 Con LR 17 (CA) (by a majority of 2:1): The effect of paragraph 9 of Schedule 8, was that, from 28 June 2022, no further service charges of the relevant type were payable, whether the underlying costs had been incurred, or whether service charges had been demanded or fallen due [204, 206].
Service out
HB (WM) Ltd v Sto Ltd [2026] EWHC 1833 (TCC): Application to set aside service out of the jurisdiction of s130 and s149 claims against a German manufacturer and parent company dismissed [108]. Where English law governs the underlying liability there is no difficulty in applying the BSA to an associated company, in this case a foreign one [77]-[81].
Specified Building
BDW Trading Ltd v Ardmore Construction Ltd & Ors (2025) 219 ConLR 1: A BLO concerned a relevant liability “relating to a specified building” (s130(2)). Therefore, a BLO could not make associated companies liable for the entire liability of the original body across a number of developments. Discrete orders would need to be made [13, obiter].
Specific Performance (commercial lease)
Essendi UK Hotels 2 Limited v London Property Company Limited (2026) 226 ConLR 133 (TCC): specific performance of landlord covenants under a commercial lease requiring removal and replacement of ACM cladding panels in circumstances where a RO was not available pursuant to the terms of the BSA.
Storey
Blomfield & Ors v Monier Road Limited (Smoke House) (FTT) (LON/00BG/HYI/2023/0024): A rooftop garden was a “storey”, such that the building was a higher risk building under BSA Part IV [62]. Government guidance (which suggested a garden was not a storey) was not followed, and did not constitute a reliable method of interpretation of law [74]. (NB. The Government’s webpage states that the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government is currently consulting relevant stakeholders on a proposal to amend the Higher-Risk Buildings (Descriptions and Supplementary Provisions) Regulations to make clear that roof gardens should not be considered a storey: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/ criteria-for-determining-whether-an existing-building-is-a-higher-risk building-during-building-work)
T
Timing (BLO application)
Nothing in s130 BSA made it a precondition to the making of a BLO that the relevant liability of the “original body” (s130(2) BSA) needed to already have been established. BLO applications could be made before the trial of the original body’s liability, could proceed in tandem with the litigation against the original body or, in a given case, be convenient to defer consideration until after trial against the original body (BDW Trading Ltd v Ardmore Construction Ltd & Ors (2025) 219 ConLR 1 [14, obiter]; Willmott Dixon Construction Ltd v Prater [2024] EWHC 1190 (TCC), 214 ConLR 164; 381 Southwark Park Road RTM Company Limited v Click St. Andrews Limited [2024] EWHC 3179 (TCC)).
U
Ultimate responsibility
Adriatic Land 5 Limited v The Long Leaseholders at Hippersley Point (2025) 221 Con LR 17 (CA): Whoever ends up bearing the costs (as a result of the leaseholder protections) is given new rights against those ultimately responsible by way of: (i) an extended limitation period under the DPA 1972 (s135 BSA); and (ii) a new cause of action against those manufacturing or mis-selling cladding protects (s149 BSA). In addition, the High Court is given power to make associated companies liable for breaches of the DPA 1972 (s130) [175]. Edgewater (Stevenage) Limited & Ors v Grey GR Limited Partnership (Vista Tower) (UTT) [2026] UKUT 18 (LC): Once Parliament had made the decision to intervene in the 30 Keating Chambers BSA Update October 2026 contractual scheme of obligations by protecting leaseholders from the full extent of their service charge liability, it was necessary for Parliament to deal with consequential matters, including who would pick up the costs that were no longer to be met through the service charges, and what rights the latter would have to make claims over those ultimately responsible. The jurisdiction in s124 was part of this Parliamentary purpose [110].
V
Variation (RCO)
Edgewater (Stevenage) Limited & Ors v Grey GR Limited Partnership (Vista Tower) (UTT) [2026] UKUT 18 (LC): Whether a s124 RCO could be varied, for example to re-arrange apportioned shares, in reliance on s124 was seriously doubted. The FTT’s case management powers, to amend, suspend or set aside earlier directions (Rule 6 of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013), did not permit such variation [140-141].
