As the Supreme Court acknowledged in its landmark decision in URS Corporation Ltd v BDW Trading Ltd [2025] UKSC 21 the Grenfell Fire on 14th June 2017 has set in motion considerable change in the construction industry – and, of course, substantial amounts of litigation.
In this article, I will attempt to summarise what went wrong at Grenfell with such devastating consequences and how the Public Inquiry chaired by Sir Martin Moore-Bick analysed these failures and made recommendations to avoid a similar future tragedy.
The then Prime Minister, Theresa May, appointed Sir Martin on 29th June 2027. He decided to divide the Inquiry into two Phases. Phase 1, which reported in October 2019, essentially dealt with the immediate circumstances of the fire. However, the Inquiry was able to conclude that:
“2.13…
a. The principal reason why the flames spread so rapidly up, down and around the building was the presence of the aluminium composite material (ACM) rainscreen panels with polyethylene cores, which acted as a source of fuel.
b. The presence of polyisocyanurate (PIR) and phenolic foam insulation boards behind the ACM panels, and perhaps components of the window surrounds, contributed to the rate and extent of vertical flame spread.”
The focus of Phase 2, which opened in January 2020, was upon the long-term failures, principally in the construction industry, which had allowed these dangerously flammable materials to be affixed to a tower block. The Inquiry heard a great deal of evidence, and examined huge numbers of documents, between January 2020 and November 2022.
The Phase 2 Report (of what was now a Panel chaired by Sir Martin) criticised numerous parties and rehearsed the evidence in great detail. However, the essence of the matter so far as the construction industry was concerned was clear and obvious from the start. Five parties, or groups of parties, had brought about the tragedy.
The most culpable were the “crooks and killers” who sold the unsafe materials: Arconic, Celotex and Kingspan. There was “systematic dishonesty on the part of those who made and sold the rainscreen cladding panels and insulation products. They engaged in deliberate and sustained strategies to manipulate the testing processes, misrepresent test data and mislead the market” (Phase 2 Report para 2.19). For example, Kingspan:
“knowingly created a false market in insulation for use on buildings over 18 metres in height by claiming that K15 had been part of a system successfully tested under BS 8414 and could therefore be used in the external wall of any building over 18 metres in height regardless of its design or other components… cynically exploited the industry’s lack of detailed knowledge about BS 8414 and BR 135 and relied on the fact that an unsuspecting market was very likely to rely on its own claims about the product”
(paras 2.32 and 2.39)
The suppliers got away with this massive and sustained fraud because the testing system, intended to root out defective products, was wholly compromised. The Building Research Establishment (BRE) was “complicit in that strategy”. The BRE’s work was “marred by unprofessional conduct, inadequate practices, a lack of effective oversight, poor reporting and a lack of scientific rigour” (paras 2.5 and 2.18). The BRE, which had been privatised in 1997, was far too close to its clients, upon whom it depended for revenue. Other testing and certification bodies, notably the British Board of Agrément and Local Authority Building Control (LABC), failed to ensure that the statements in their product certificates were accurate and based on test evidence.
Presiding over this unholy alliance of dishonest suppliers and inadequate testing/certification bodies were successive governments. They failed to identify the risks posed by the use of combustible cladding panels and insulation, particularly to high-rise buildings, and to take action in relation to them, in particular by clarifying the applicable regulatory framework. Partly this was due to bureaucratic inertia and ignorance, but politics played a significant part:
“In the years that followed the Lakanal House fire the government’s deregulatory agenda, enthusiastically supported by some junior ministers and the Secretary of State, dominated the department’s thinking to such an extent that even matters affecting the safety of life were ignored, delayed or disregarded.” (para 2.13)
The dangerous materials were then specified by the architects Studio E and used by the main contractors Rydon and their curtain wall sub-contractors Harley. These parties were unaware of the risks of using combustible materials in the external walls of high-rise buildings. That was because they “were not familiar with or did not understand the relevant provisions of the Building Regulations, Approved Document B or industry guidance” (para 2.75).
Finally, those who should have spotted the dangers of using these materials were equally ignorant and incompetent:
“RBKC building control did not properly scrutinise the design or choice of materials and failed to satisfy itself that on completion of the work the building would comply with the requirements of the Building Regulations.
Exova was instructed by Studio E on behalf of the TMO to prepare a fire safety strategy for the building in its refurbished form. A draft was prepared but never completed. In particular, it did not include an analysis of the external wall or its compliance with functional requirement B4(1) of the Building Regulations”
(paras 2.76 and 2.77)
The Inquiry made 58 recommendations and the present Government has broadly accepted them. These recommendations are, in the main, fairly anodyne, for example that RIBA should review the changes already made in the education and training of architects to ensure they are sufficient in the light of the Inquiry’s findings (recommendation 19). Likewise, the Inquiry suggests that a Cladding Materials Library be created to provide a continuing resource for designers (recommendation 24).
No one could really object to these proposals, but it is hard to believe that they will transform a fragmented, poorly trained construction industry or a largely privatised “system” of testing, certification and inspection. Moreover, the Inquiry has not come up with a convincing way to control bad corporate actors like Kingspan, who continue to operate in plain sight in spite of the Inquiry’s stinging criticism (revenue up 6% to €8.6bn; trading profit up 3% to €907m in the year ended 31 December 2024,).1
Despite the thorough work of the Inquiry, and some subsequent actions on the part of Government, it is difficult to disagree with the “rather gloomy” views expressed by Lord Justice Coulson in his 2023 Keating Lecture.
“116…Almost six years after Grenfell, I see no imminent prospect of real change. There are a number of fundamental difficulties which remain embedded in the system of Building Regulation…
123. Apparently, 15/20 years ago, when those concerned with building safety endeavoured to put pressure on the Government to make the Building Regulations more prescriptive, they were dismissed as naysayers. It was alleged that, when told how weak the current regulatory system was, the relevant official said “Show me the bodies”: in other words, show me the evidence that the deregulated system of building regulation does not work. I would respectfully suggest that the dead at Lakanal House and Grenfell Tower have, tragically, proved just that. The present way of doing things, with the double standard and the repeated emphasis on deregulation, has manifestly not worked. It is time to go about things in a radically different way.”
Adrian Williamson KC was instructed on behalf of the Bereaved Survivors and Residents on the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report.
The full article was written by Adrian Williamson KC and is part of the first issue of the Keating Chambers BSA Update.
1 https://www.kingspangroup.com/en/news-insights/kingspan-group-plc-full-year-results-2024/